What is Science? An open dialetic with The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae and GSTalbert1

Discussion in 'Science & Technology' started by GSTalbert1, Oct 27, 2012.

  1. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    @The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae
    I made the thread I will be structuring here a series of short paragraph summaries of current theories on what is science.

    Rules:

     
  2. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    Supplementary sources
     
  3. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    Key responses: What is science?
     
  4. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    Notes & Commentary


    @The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900 has supported and sill supports as equal sciences:

    • Fairyology
    • Alchemy
    • Marxism
    • Demonology
    • Theology
    • Magic
    • Witchcraft
    • Wika
    • Bronyology
    • Hermeneutics
    • Wikipediology
    • Feminism
    • Marxist Feminism
    • Phrenology
    • Phenomonology
    • Hegelism
    @The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900@The Member Formerly Known As Baya Rae 4900
     
  5. Baya Rae 4900

    Baya Rae 4900
    Expand Collapse
    Lawlman

    Joined:
    Jul 14, 2011
    Messages:
    37,068
    Occupation:
    Nazi Chocolate (25.8069)
    Home Page:
    Dude, I already told you...

     
  6. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    I though you wanted to have a philosophical debate on the nature of theory and application in science and innovation?
     
  7. Baya Rae 4900

    Baya Rae 4900
    Expand Collapse
    Lawlman

    Joined:
    Jul 14, 2011
    Messages:
    37,068
    Occupation:
    Nazi Chocolate (25.8069)
    Home Page:
    Do you disagree with my analysis?
     
  8. Porn

    Porn
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Hero

    Joined:
    Aug 1, 2012
    Messages:
    602
    Occupation:
    Quality poster
    Baby don't debate me, debate me no more
     
  9. Solution

    Solution
    Expand Collapse
    Everyone is boring

    Joined:
    Dec 3, 2011
    Messages:
    9,228
    Home Page:
    thailand_nopopcorn_2011_cabaret.
     
  10. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    Good point!

    Rule
    NO FOOD OR DRINK ALLOWED IN THE AUDITORIUM!
     
  11. Porn

    Porn
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Hero

    Joined:
    Aug 1, 2012
    Messages:
    602
    Occupation:
    Quality poster
    ARE YOU PROVOKING ME???
     
  12. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    No, food and syrupy drinks that get left on the floor are hard on the custodial staff.

     
  13. Porn

    Porn
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Hero

    Joined:
    Aug 1, 2012
    Messages:
    602
    Occupation:
    Quality poster
    Don't worry, I'll make sure to aim my rotten tomatoes at your head, not somewhere else.
     
  14. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    I'll have to dodge them then
     
  15. Porn

    Porn
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Hero

    Joined:
    Aug 1, 2012
    Messages:
    602
    Occupation:
    Quality poster
    You'll never see it coming.
     
  16. Baya Rae 4900

    Baya Rae 4900
    Expand Collapse
    Lawlman

    Joined:
    Jul 14, 2011
    Messages:
    37,068
    Occupation:
    Nazi Chocolate (25.8069)
    Home Page:


     
    • Like Like x 5
    • Autism Autism x 5
    • List
  17. BeardBrain

    BeardBrain
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Hero

    Joined:
    Oct 15, 2011
    Messages:
    426
    Occupation:
    Faith Smasher
    Home Page:
    Read "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" by Karl Popper and you're all set.
     
  18. faggotmaximum

    faggotmaximum
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Hero

    Joined:
    Jul 20, 2011
    Messages:
    1,563
    Occupation:
    rape
    thread title:

    just kill me now
     
  19. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    3.1 Popper and the critique of Marxism and psychoanalysis
    Karl Popper had a considerable influence on philosophy of science during the twentieth century and many scientists took up his ideas.
    64
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    As a result, he was made a member of the Royal Society of London, which is one of the most prestigious scientific associations. In fact, Popper’s falsificationism is probably now more popular among scien- tists than it is among philosophers. Popper also played an important role in the intellectual critique of Marxism, and his books The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies are still widely read by political theorists today. His interest in phil- osophy of science began with the search for a demarcation between science and pseudo-science. He tried to work out what the difference was between theories he greatly admired in physics, and theories he thought were unscientific in psychology and sociology, and soon came to the conclusion that part of the reason why people errone- ously thought that mere pseudo-sciences were scientific was that they had a mistaken view about what made physics scientific.
    The main battleground of the debate about demarcation is social science. The ideal of social science was a product of the eighteenth century, which was a time of general intellectual excitement and enthusiasm for the success of Newtonian physics and the other new sciences of chemistry, physiology and so on, that had recently advanced and expanded rapidly. Various thinkers suggested that the logical next step was the application of the same methods to the discovery of the laws that governed human behaviour and the way societies functioned. This period in intellectual history is known as ‘the age of enlightenment and reason’ and it was characterised by a profound optimism about what could be achieved if only human beings could learn to organise themselves on a rational basis in accordance with a genuine science of society. At the time, when Popper formed his views about science, in the early part of the twen- tieth century, there were theories of the social and psychological nature of human beings that were claimed by their adherents to fulfil the Enlightenment promise of a genuine science of society and human behaviour. Marxism and psychoanalysis were prominent among these theories.
    At the funeral of Karl Marx (1818–1883), his friend and collaborator Frederick Engels (1820–1895) said that just as Darwin had discovered the scientific principles underlying the development of species, so Marx had discovered the scientific principles underlying the development of societies. Similarly, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939)
    65
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    claimed that his own discoveries were comparable to those of Copernicus and Darwin, and considered his theories of sexual repression, and of ego, id and superego and so on to be fully scien- tific. For various reasons, Marxism and psychoanalysis are both widely perceived (perhaps correctly) as somewhat discredited today; however, many of the twentieth century’s greatest intellects were influenced by one or other of them, and it is arguable that their effect on the history of the twentieth century was profound. When he was young, Popper was attracted by both Marxism and psycho- analysis yet fairly quickly he grew disillusioned with them. He came to regard both as pseudo-scientific and set about trying to explain what it was about them and the way they were practised that led him to this view.
    Popper realised that it was easy to think of both these theories as very successful sciences if one assumed that scientific knowledge pro- ceeds, and is justified, by the accumulation of positive instances of theories and laws. On this view, as we have seen, the justification of a law such as all metals expand on heating would be a matter of there being many cases of particular metals that expanded when heated. Marxists and psychoanalysts both had numerous examples of phe- nomena that were instances of their general principles. The problem, as far as Popper was concerned, is that it is just too easy to accumu- late positive instances which support some theory, especially when the theory is so general in its claims that its seems not to rule anything out. Popper certainly seems to be on to something here. People are often disdainful of horoscopes precisely because they are so general it is hard to see what would not count as supporting evidence for their claims. For example, your horoscope might read ‘you will have money worries shortly’. There are not many people who don’t regu- larly have money troubles. Similarly, suppose your astrological chart says that you lack confidence, or that you are friendly but sometimes shy. Very few people can claim to be confident in all respects or never to feel shy in some circumstances. Of course, I am not arguing here that astrology is a psuedo-science, and I am sure that some astro- logers say things that are much more specific. The point is that if someone does make such vague pronouncements, it is surely not enough to make their theory scientific that many instances can be found that conform to it. Hence, Popper thought that theories that
    66
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    seem to have great explanatory power are suspect precisely because so much can be explained by them.
    Similarly, Popper says that many adherents of Marxism and psychoanalysis are over-impressed with explanatory power and see confirmations everywhere. He argues that Marxists see every strike as further evidence for the theory of class struggle, and that psycho- analysts treat every instance of neurosis as further evidence for Freud’s theories. The trouble with their theories is they do not make precise predictions, and any phenomena that occur can be accounted for. Indeed, both theories are able to explain evidence that seems at first sight to refute them. So, for example, various measures to safe- guard the safety and welfare of workers were introduced in England in the nineteenth century and this fact would seem to conflict with Marxism, according to which the ruling class has no interest in ensur- ing decent living and working conditions for the poor. Yet some Marxists have argued that, in fact, the introduction of the poor laws and so on confirm Marxism because they show that the capitalists were aware of the imminence of the proletarian revolution and were trying to placate the workers in order to stop or delay it.
    In the case of psychoanalysis, Popper gives two different examples of human behaviour; the first is that of a man pushing a child into water intending to drown it and the second is of a man jumping in and sacrificing his life to save the child. Freud could explain the first by positing that the man suffered from repression, and the second by saying he had achieved sublimation. Alfred Adler (1870–1937) could explain the first by saying that the man suffered from feelings of inferiority and so needed to prove to himself that he could commit the crime, and the second by saying that the man also suffered from feelings of inferiority but needed to prove to himself that he was brave enough to rescue the child. Popper’s complaint then is that the central principles of these theories are so general as to be compatible with any particular observations and too many of those who believe them cannot even imagine circumstances under which they would be empirically refuted because they are like a lens through which they view the world.
    So, in general, Popper’s worry about the idea that confirmation is fundamental to the scientific method is that if you are in the grip of a theory it is easy to find confirming instances, especially if the theory is
    67
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    one that is vague and general. By contrast, Popper was particularly impressed by the experimental confirmation of Einstein’s general theory of relativity in 1917. The latter predicted that light passing close to the Sun ought to have its path bent by the Sun’s gravitational field. The admirable thing about the theory as far as Popper was concerned was that it made a prediction that was very risky, which is to say that could easily have turned out to be false. There are plenty of other examples of such potentially falsifying, and therefore risky, predictions made by scientific theories. For example, Newton’s theory predicted the return of Halley’s comet during 1758, and made numerous other precise predictions for the behaviour of mechanical systems. However, the most compelling types of prediction for Popper were so-called novel predictions, which were predictions of new types of phenomena or entities. The example from general rela- tivity mentioned above is of this kind. Another famous example is Dmitry Mendeléeff’s (1834–1907) prediction of the existence of the previously unknown elements of gallium and selenium derived from the structure of the Periodic Table of the elements. Popper thought that the issuing of novel and risky predictions was a common charac- teristic of scientific theories and that this, combined with scientists’ willingness to reject a theory if its predictions were not observed, was what made science so intellectually respectable.
    So Popper argued that the ‘confirmation’ that a theory is supposed to get from observation of an instance that fits the theory, only really counts for anything when it is an instance that was a risky prediction by the theory; that is, if it is a potential falsifier of the theory. He thought that the impressive thing about genuine scientific theories is that they make precise predictions of surprising phenomena and genuine scientists are prepared to reject them if their predictions are not borne out by experiments. Not only are Marxism and psycho- analysis too vague to be subject to refutation by experience, but fur- thermore, Marxists and psychoanalysts are also sometimes inclined to side-step intellectual critique because their theories explain why people will oppose them. If one rejects Marxism one may well be accused of having a class interest in maintaining the capitalist system; similarly, someone who strongly opposes psychoanalysis may well be accused of being repressed. Of course, it is possible either or both of these claims are correct in many or even all cases; the point is just that
    68
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    these theories seem to foreclose the possibility of criticism, and it was this characteristic that Popper considered anathema to science. Hence, Popper came to the view that it is not confirmation but falsifi- cation that is at the heart of the scientific method.
    3.2 Popper’s solution to the problem of induction
    Popper’s solution to the problem of induction is simply to argue that it does not show that scientific knowledge is not justified, because science does not depend on induction at all. Popper pointed out that there is a logical asymmetry between confirmation and falsification of a universal generalisation. The problem of induction arises because no matter how many positive instances of a generalisation are observed it is still possible that the next instance will falsify it. How- ever, if we take a generalisation such as all swans are white, then we need only observe one swan that is not white to falsify this hypoth- esis. Popper argued that science is fundamentally about falsifying rather than confirming theories, and so he thought that science could proceed without induction because the inference from a falsifying instance to the falsity of a theory is purely deductive. (Hence, his theory of scientific method is called falsificationism.)
    Popper argued that a theory that was, in principle, unfalsifiable by experience was unscientific. Examples of statements that are not falsifiable include:
    Either it is raining or it is not raining. God has no cause. All bachelors are unmarried. It is logically possible that space is infinite. Human beings have free will.
    Clearly, no number of observations would be sufficient to refute any of these theories. Now as we have seen, Popper also thought that a theory like ‘all neuroses are caused by childhood trauma’ was unfal- sifiable and so unscientific. On the other hand, he though that Marx- ism was falsifiable and so potentially scientific, since it predicted an internationalisation of the working class and a communist revolu- tion. Popper just thought that Marxists were clinging on to a refuted
    69
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    theory and so were bad scientists. (It should be noted that here the distinction between being a bad scientist and a pseudo-scientist becomes somewhat unclear.) On the other hand, the examples of scientific theories we have considered are falsifiable because there are observations that are inconsistent with them. If we were to observe a metal that did not expand when heated we would know that the generalisation ‘all metals expand when heated’ was false. Similarly, if light did not obey the law of reflection we could observe this, and if bodies do not obey Newton’s law of gravitation we ought to be able to observe their deviations from its predictions.
    Having distinguished between falsifiable and unfalsifiable hypoth- eses, Popper argues that science proceeds not by testing a theory and accumulating positive inductive support for it, but by trying to falsify theories; the true way to test a theory is not to try and show that it is true but to try and show that it is false. Once a hypothesis has been developed, predictions must be deduced from it so that it can be subjected to experimental testing. If it is falsified then it is abandoned, but if it is not falsified this just means it ought to be subjected to ever more stringent tests and ingenious attempts to falsify it. So what we call confirmation is, according to Popper, really just unsuccessful falsification:
    [F]alsificationists like myself much prefer an attempt to solve an interesting problem by a bold conjecture, even (and espe- cially) if it soon turns out to be false, to any recital of a sequence of irrelevant truisms. We prefer this because we believe that this is the way in which we can learn from our mistakes; and that in finding that our conjecture was false we shall have learnt much about the truth, and shall have got nearer to the truth.
    (Popper 1969: 231)
    This is why Popper’s methodology of science is often called the method of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (and indeed that was the name of one of his books). ‘Bold’ conjectures are those from which we can deduce the sort of novel predictions discussed above. According to Popper, science proceeds by something like natural selection and scientists learn only from their mistakes. There is no positive support for the fittest theories, rather they are just those that
    70
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    repeatedly survive attempts to falsify them and so are the ones that are retained by the scientific community. It is always possible that our best theories will be falsified tomorrow and so their status is that of conjectures that have not yet been refuted rather than that of con- firmed theories. Popper thought that it is here that the intellectual corruption of Marxists and psychoanalysts lies for whether or not their theories are falsifiable – they do not state clearly the conditions under which they would give up their theories. It is this commitment to their theories that Popper thinks is unscientific. In fact, he demands of scientists that they specify in advance under what experimental conditions they would give up their most basic assumptions. For Popper, everything in science is provisional and subject to correction or replacement:
    [W]e must not look upon science as a ‘body of knowledge’, but rather as a system of hypotheses which in principle cannot be justified, but with which we work as long as they stand up to tests, and of which we are never justified in saying that we know they are ‘true’ or ‘more or less certain’ or even ‘probable’.
    (Popper 1959: 317)
    The view that knowledge must be certain, a matter of proof and not subject to error has a long history in philosophy. However, from Popper we learn that we should always have a critical attitude to our best scientific theories. The history of science teaches us that even theories that in their time were considered highly confirmed and which enjoyed a huge amount of empirical success, have been shown to be quite mistaken in certain domains. Overall, the history of sci- ence has seen profound changes in fundamental principles. For example, the Newtonian conception of a world of material particles exerting gravitational forces on each other and subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics whizzing around in the void was replaced by the idea of a field that was present at all the points of space. Special relativity and quantum mechanics meant that the basic laws of mech- anics had to be revised, and general relativity has led to radical changes in the way we view the universe and space and time. On a more mundane level, heat was once widely believed to be a material fluid (‘caloric’) that flowed unseen but felt, but now it is thought of as a manifestation of the kinetic energy of particles; whales are no
    71
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    longer regarded as fish, and the age of the Earth is now thought to be millions not thousands of years.
    In the light of all this, it is not surprising that today not many people believe that any scientific theory is provable beyond all doubt. Popper fully endorses the philosophical position known as falliblism according to which all our knowledge of the world is provisional and subject to correction in the future. His theory of knowledge is thoroughly anti-authoritarian and this is linked to his critique of totalitarian systems of government. In his view, the programmes to create ideal societies proposed by the likes of Plato and Marx demanded rigid adherence to a single fixed ideology and the repression of all dissenting views. On the contrary, Popper thought that science flourished in an atmosphere where nothing is sacred and scientists can be extremely adventurous in the theories they propose. As his colleague Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) says, according to Popper, ‘virtue lies not in caution in avoiding errors but in ruthlessness in eliminating them’ (Lakatos 1968: 150). This accords with the familiar idea that scientists should be sceptical even about their own theories and should be ready to challenge any dogma if experiment demands it.
    It is important to note that, unlike the logical positivists, Popper did not offer a way of distinguishing meaningful from meaningless statements and then argue that pseudo-science is meaningless. On the contrary, he thought that hypotheses that were not falsifiable could still be perfectly meaningful. Nor indeed did Popper argue that only what was falsifiable was helpful or productive even within science. Hence, he did not think that unfalsifiable metaphysical theories ought to be rejected altogether, for he recognised that sometimes scientists might be inspired to make interesting bold conjectures by beliefs that are themselves unscientific. So for example, many scientists have been influenced by their belief in God, or by their belief in the simplicity of the basic laws of physics, but clearly neither the proposition that God exists or that the fundamental structure of the world is simple is falsifiable by experience. Popper’s theory of the scientific method allows such beliefs to play a role in scientific life even though they are not themselves scientific hypotheses.
    Popper’s main concern was to criticise pseudo-science because its adherents try to persuade people that their theories are scientific
    72
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    when they are not. It does not follow from the demarcation of science from pseudo-science that he proposed that there is anything wrong with a discipline or practice being non-scientific. In fact, Popper thought that both Marxism and psychoanalysis might embody important insights into the human condition; his point is just that they are not scientific, not that they are therefore not valuable. Obvi- ously a strong case could be made for the value of religious beliefs, and it is perfectly possible for someone with religious faith and beliefs to accept a definite demarcation between science and religion (in fact I suspect this may be the case with many scientists).
    As I pointed out above, the falsificationist does not view all scien- tific theories equally. Some theories are falsifiable but the phenomena they predict are not interesting or surprising. Hence, the hypothesis that it will be sunny tomorrow is certainly falsifiable though it is not of great value within science. Recall that the hypotheses that Popper prizes above all others are bold conjectures that make novel predic- tions. In fact, Popper believed that hypotheses can be compared to see which is more falsifiable: for example, take the hypothesis (1) that all metals expand on heating; it is more falsifiable than the hypothesis (2) that copper expands on heating, because the former hypothesis is inconsistent with more observation statements, in particular, it is inconsistent with observation statements about particular bits of iron and silver not expanding when heated as well as those that just con- cern copper. In this case, the set of all potential falsifiers of (2) is a subset of the set of all potential falsifiers of (1), and hence (1) is more falsifiable than (2).
    Popper thought that theories could be ranked according to their degree of falsifiability and that this is the true measure of their empirical content. The more falsifiable a theory is the better it is because if it is highly falsifiable it must make precise predictions about a large range of phenomena. This seems to accord with an intuitive idea of what makes a particular scientific theory a good one. Scientists ought to aim to develop theories that are as falsifiable as possible which means the theories need to be both precise and have a broad content. For example, a hypothesis such as ‘metals change shape when heated’ is falsifiable and broad in scope but not precise enough to be highly falsifiable, while a hypothesis such as ‘this piece of copper expands on heating’ is pretty precise but of narrow scope.
    73
    FALSIFICATIONISM
    Ideally, from the falsificationist point of view, science ought to consist of hypotheses that apply to a wide range of phenomena, but also make precise quantitative predictions. This is the situation with many of our best scientific theories, for example, Newton’s mechanics gives precise predictions for a wide range of phenomena, from the motions of comets in the heavens to the paths of cannon balls near the surface of the Earth. Popper also argued that new theories ought to be more falsifiable than the theories they replace. This certainly fits with many episodes in the history of science; for example, Newton’s theory was more precise than Kepler’s which it succeeded, the theory of relativity improved upon the predictions of both Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, and so on. It seems that some of the basic ideas of falsificationism do accord with some of our intuitions about science.

    UNDERSTANDING PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
    James Ladyman
    First published 2002 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
    Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001
    Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
    This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002.
    © 2002 James Ladyman
    All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
    British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
    A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
    Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
    Ladyman, James, 1969– . Understanding philosophy of science/James Ladyman.
    p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Science – Philosophy. I. Title.
    Q175.L174 2001 501 – dc21
    ISBN 0–415–22156–0 (hbk)
    ISBN 0–415–22157–9 (pbk)
    2001048105
    ISBN 0-203-46368-4 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-77192-3 (Glassbook Format)

    I'll look for more current sources but really not much has changed in this arena.
     
  20. scumhook

    scumhook
    Expand Collapse
    Managing account details

    Joined:
    Jul 15, 2011
    Messages:
    20,008
    Occupation:
    Fellator of the homeless
    Home Page:
    I will bet my left nut that this will be the only good post in what promises to be a colossal toss of a thraed.
     
  21. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    What do you think is science?
     
  22. scumhook

    scumhook
    Expand Collapse
    Managing account details

    Joined:
    Jul 15, 2011
    Messages:
    20,008
    Occupation:
    Fellator of the homeless
    Home Page:
    Getting the balance of meat, cheese, salad and condiments just right on a sandwich.
     
  23. demongoat

    demongoat
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Elite

    Joined:
    Jul 31, 2012
    Messages:
    1,647
    Occupation:
    Philosopher Goat
    science is the study of the world around us, using experimentation, observation, logic, reasoning and imagination.

    i don't think much of popper, he was a philosopher not a scientist and as martin gardener points out, tried to expunge induction from science.
    http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
    induction is as much part of science(logic) as observation or experimentation, drawing conclusions from induction is a core part of science, some of the most useful scientific outcomes come from inductive reasoning.
     
  24. Baya Rae 4900

    Baya Rae 4900
    Expand Collapse
    Lawlman

    Joined:
    Jul 14, 2011
    Messages:
    37,068
    Occupation:
    Nazi Chocolate (25.8069)
    Home Page:
    @GSTalbert1 Speaking of critique, have you read Mises' earliest critique of Marxism yet?
     
  25. Fraud Based Economy

    Fraud Based Economy
    Expand Collapse
    Disinherited Nigerian Prince

    Joined:
    Aug 21, 2011
    Messages:
    2,848
    If video games have taught me anything, it's that science is forcing a bunch of bums/homeless people/uppity minorities into a death trap run by a crazy AI, and waiting to see how long they last before they either screw up and kill themselves or die of starvation.
     
  26. White nationalist

    White nationalist
    Expand Collapse
    EDF Hero

    Joined:
    Sep 15, 2012
    Messages:
    1,019
    Occupation:
    Task Force 141 Specialist Callsign "GodRapist"
    http://rule34-data-002.say no to pedo shit/_images/4c639839df6dc9e294dd052b34a4b34a/907919%20-%20Call_of_Duty%20John_Price%20MacMillan.png

    This is science
     
  27. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    Intriguing?

    How do we resolve this conflict of sources?
     
  28. GSTalbert1

    GSTalbert1
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Mar 31, 2012
    Messages:
    6,754
    Occupation:
    Part Time Substitute Teacher Full time Teal Deer
    First gather data and organize the strains of thought.
     
  29. CallMeMaggot

    CallMeMaggot
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Jul 15, 2011
    Messages:
    14,477
    Home Page:
    He said that hypotheses that were not falsifiable could still be perfectly meaningful, just not scientific.

    No problem there

    Anyways, I strongly disagree, induction is fundamental to science...in fact, I can't see how a theory (or a law) can be established (or even proposed) without inductive reasoning, unless you have explored the entire universe.

    Tho, when he said "I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified." he was technically right...but that doesn't take you anywhere, you can't beat brian-in-a-vat scenarios. Or Maxwell demon's cousins.

    But what is the utility of solipsistic scenarios?

    None. Keep walking, tnx.
     
  30. Bottom Feeder

    Bottom Feeder
    Expand Collapse
    Girlvinyl

    Joined:
    Nov 1, 2011
    Messages:
    5,963
    Occupation:
    GBP Management Assistant
    I wonder if OP considers psychology a science.